

Mapping False Climate Solutions in Peru

What are False Climate Solutions?

The climate crisis is a systemic, structural crisis; as globally dominant economic, political and social systems have led us to disrupt the balance of most of our planet's ecological boundaries (Rockström et al., Sultana). This ecological and climatic upheaval disproportionately affects the most marginalized communities, and threatens our collective survival. This crisis is not a *failure* of these dominant systems, but rather part and parcel of what they have been intended for since the intertwined rise of capitalism and colonialism: the exploitation of the vast majority of people and the planet for the benefit of a few (Angus, Gonzalez, Murphy and Schroering, Hoodwinked). Due to this, nothing short of structural transformation can or will significantly change the trajectory of current global warming trends.

However, mainstream actors and institutions are increasingly relying on the possibility of techno-fixes, geoengineering and market-based mechanisms to address climate change while simultaneously avoiding structural change - instead relying on the very tools and paradigms of dominant systems. These mechanisms are what climate justice movements term “false climate solutions,” as they claim to “solve” climate change while in fact perpetuating business-as-usual (Hoodwinked). These false solutions heighten inequities, harm communities and the environment, and distract from and ultimately impede substantial action to address climate impacts. As such, these so-called solutions constitute *greenwashing*. By allowing business-as-usual to continue, false solutions benefit those who have historically and structurally profited from the systems that brought about the climate crisis in the first place, and who are now perversely selling their “good deeds” while perpetuating harm to people and planet. False solutions distract from and ultimately impede substantial action to address climate impacts, which disproportionately affect the most marginalized communities.

In the face of this, communities globally are engaging in collective action to confront these false solutions, and to address the root causes of the climate crisis and mitigate its impacts. This includes indigenous and rural communities who are directly impacted by engineering and market-based interventions and the encroachment of their lands, territories, ecosystems and more. And in addition to denouncing that which causes harm, they are building meaningful alternatives. In a world where those in power want us to believe that “there is no alternative” -that is, where all solutions to the crisis must exist within the framework of dominant systems-, communities are saying, through words and actions, that there are in fact many ways out of this crisis, through alternatives that center care for people and the planet.

What is the Map of False Climate Solutions in Latin America?

The Map of False Climate Solutions in Latin America is an online participatory mapping tool created by the Latin American and Caribbean Platform for Climate Justice (PLACJC) and the

Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice (DCJ). The map seeks to visualize false climate solution projects that are currently in development and operation throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. The map website also features a guide which provides a definition and criteria to identify false climate solutions. Any visitor to the website can submit a false climate solution case based on this criteria, via a Google Form that is readily available. Each case that is submitted is reviewed and then added to the map by the Collective of Critical Geography in Ecuador, who administers the map under the umbrella of PLACJC and DCJ.

Criteria to define a False Climate Solution

Created in 2024 by PLACJC and DCJ, the Guide to Understanding and Resisting False Solutions states that false solutions in Latin America include: harmful “green energy” projects, carbon storage projects such as REDD+, geoengineering, resource extraction for “green” technologies, nature-based solutions that commercialize ecosystem functions and underpin carbon compensation schemes, and large infrastructure projects for climate adaptation.

The False Solutions to the Climate Crisis Map uses the following interconnected criteria to assess whether a project is detrimental to communities and the environment and can be classified as a false solution:

- Projects that purport to address climate change, but entail:
 - Implementation without democracy (ie. imposed, not participatory)
 - Increase of workplace abuse
 - Exposure to agrochemicals
 - Loss of biodiversity
 - Forced displacement of Indigenous Peoples and communities
 - Food insecurity
 - Loss of traditional ancestral knowledge
 - Weakening of land tenure agreements
 - Violation of the rights of humans and Nature

These criteria focus on impacts to indigenous peoples, who in the region are uniquely and disproportionately affected by extractive projects and encroachment on their lands. As such, the map strives to be a tool to make visible these impacts and support the resistance of indigenous peoples in the face of these threats and harm. Among the impacts highlighted are the rights to information and participation for all communities directly affected by these “climate solutions” projects, which is also a core tenet of environmental justice and equity.

The Aronson Project: Mapping False Climate Solutions in Peru

Supported by the Aronson Fellowship, I collaborated with my collective, TierrActiva Peru and allies, to add more cases to the false climate solutions map, to support the visibility of the impacts of false solutions on marginalized communities in Peru. Prior to this project, there were only two cases for Peru listed, when grassroots community members and advocates know there are many more. To carry this mapping out, we reached out to our networks and allies, to pool written and oral collective knowledge and information, and engage in research to submit additional cases to

the False Solutions to the Climate Crisis Map. Our objective was to support the map to be a more effective tool for awareness-raising, education, and advocacy against false solutions in Peru and the wider region. In a context of increasingly large finance flows towards mitigation and adaptation, and increased attention on climate change as its impacts become undeniable, we seek to work to ensure that climate strategies, policies and finance are and remain socially and environmentally effective and just.

Unmasking false solutions is part of unmasking those who perpetuate injustice, and of unmasking the systems that are at the root of this crisis. In this case, this “unmasking” would be a result of both research and action intertwined, as we pool information while we spread the word about the risks of false solutions. Similarly, it aligns to the Jemez Principles, namely bottom-up organizing - producing counter-maps based on community knowledge and experience, as opposed to top-down narratives-; working together in solidarity and mutuality, as a collective effort across groups and networks; and building just relationships in how we work together through transparency, complementary roles, shared decision-making and more.

In the Peruvian context, mapping tools are not commonly used except by those who have professional or academic training in them, or who are part of a minority of activists who may be connected to international EJ/CJ networks that use mapping tools. There is a large lack of information and lack of access to these tools. Through working on this mapping collectively, we also shared information on the mapping tool, aiming to increase its use as well as the relevance of its content.

I engaged in these efforts from my position as a member of TierrActiva Peru, and as a Peruvian, while recognizing my privileges as a student of a private US university, as well as my other positionalities, including that I am not -as far as I am aware- a part of a *landed* community (a community intertwined with a land) that is currently directly impacted by a false climate solution in Peru. Therefore, my approach to engaging with these issues necessarily considered power, privilege, and a continued interrogation/exploration of what solidarity building looks like.

The Mapping Process: A Collective Initiative of TierrActiva Peru

I worked with fellow members of TierrActiva, as well as allies. TierrActiva Peru is a member of both PLACJC and DCJ. In TierrActiva Peru we work in horizontal ways, through committees or working groups. As a collective we work in horizontal and flexible ways, through committees or working groups. While at times some of us might take on particular roles for specific actions or projects, these aren't permanent. We rotate and divide up the work depending on availability and interest, ensuring to coordinate with each other throughout. For this project, we are also working with allies and compañerxs who are not part of the core TierrActiva Peru group. We also extend these horizontal ways of working to our allies.

Each member of the mapping working group has their own extended networks, which includes Indigenous organizations, rural networks, civil society groups across the country, social and environmental leaders, and others. For this mapping initiative, we have appealed to our networks, and to information that those in our networks can share with us, as well as carried out desk research. As an example, one of our allies is a collaborator of the Forest Peoples Programme

(FPP), who works closely with indigenous organizations such as the Ethnic Council of the Kichwa Pueblos of the Amazon (CEPKA in Spanish). FPP and several indigenous organizations released a study on the Cordillera Escalera and Cordillera Azul natural protected areas, which exclude and affect the land rights of at least 72 Kichwa communities and have been used to sell carbon credits (Forest Peoples Programme 2022). Though this case has since reached the local court, which last year ruled favorably to the Kichwa communities, the court ruling is pending to be fully implemented. This is an example of a case that was pending to be added to the map, and which we have now submitted for inclusion into the map.

Due to limited resources and capacity, engaging in a deeper dive into specific cases for the map -that is, travelling to the specific sites to be listed in the map-, or facilitating a fully community-led mapping process -only first-hand accounts- was not feasible, as that would require travel, accompaniment and longer term engagement. Due to this, we also recognize the limitations of these mapping efforts when it comes to direct community engagement.

The core group worked together in a horizontal manner, centering transparency, dividing up roles, utilizing shared decision-making and more. TierrActiva Peru has a small pool of funds, gathered through various fundraising activities over the years, some of which will be used to recognize the labor of those putting together the cases for the map. As the funds are limited, this is a largely symbolic amount, but nonetheless important given the economic instability and precariousness most activists face. The decisions on how this funding will be allocated were made collectively, based on consensus within the core mapping group and with the approval of the larger TierrActiva collective. This is how TierrActiva has carried out special projects previously – we know that we do not do this work for the money, but also know the labor and “volunteerism” of activists is often problematically taken for granted, perpetuating inequities. This small symbolic stipend supported members of the core group to dedicate time to compiling and sharing information and submitting cases to the map. These ways of working reflect the Jemez Principles of being inclusive, building just relationships among ourselves, working together in solidarity and mutuality, and others.

This mapping initiative is a project of collective counter-cartography, carried out through sharing information through allied grassroots networks. It is a publicly available map, currently not widely known or used by activist and frontline groups and their allies in Peru, which we aim to make more known, relevant and useful to movements and wider civil society members in Peru and beyond through this project. The map is a tool that groups can then use in their public advocacy and resistance, to increase information and awareness of the concrete harmful impacts, geographical spread, and overall risks and threat of false climate solutions. While some or all of the cases may be known to advocates, having them summarized and visually accessible all in one place (albeit, to those with Internet connection and preferably a laptop/computer, an important caveat given access inequities), and under the broader umbrella of “false solutions” would be a new instrument for advocates. This is particularly relevant given the alarming increase of funding and attention given to so-called climate solutions, and the vulnerability of countries like Peru (whose territory is 75% Amazon rainforest) to the same. While the core group is at the initial stage of setting up the mapping process, and not yet its dissemination, there are also many ways in which we could share the map and the cases we add more widely, including hosting public in-person and online events on the map and on the additional cases for Peru.

Results: Four Peruvian Cases Added to the False Climate Solutions Map

We have developed four cases for the map. They are in the process of being added to the map. We also have two additional cases in draft form, for a total of six new cases. This would take Peru from two to eight verified cases of false climate solutions on the map. The four cases are:

Alto Mayo Conservation Initiative - Alto Mayo Protected Forest

- Located in the Rioja and Moyobamba provinces, region of San Martín - Peru.
- Conservation International established a REDD+ project in 2008 without consulting the local Awajún indigenous community. In 2012, CI signed a contract with the Peruvian government to manage the entire Alto Mayo protected area.
- The local population is invited to sign agreements to not cut down trees. By 2022, about half of the local population refused to sign these agreements due to limited benefits, limitations to their self-determination, and lack of trust.
- The protected area has armed guards and is a source of social conflict. The government and park administration are intentionally limiting local access to health and education services.
- Companies such as the Walt Disney, Microsoft, BHP, United Airlines, Gucci, Toyota, Paul Mitchell have purchased Alto Mayo carbon credits.

The Alto Mayo Protected Forest (BPAM) is located in the upper Mayo River basin in the provinces of Rioja and Moyobamba, in the department of San Martín, Peru. It has 182 thousand hectares. In 2012, the NGO Conservation International (CI) signed a BPAM Management Contract with the Peruvian government. CI collaborates with SERNANP, the Peruvian NGOs ECOAN, ProNaturaleza, Proyecto Mono Tocón, AIDER, and the SPDA to manage the BPAM. As part of this management, CI has implemented a REDD+ mechanism in the BPAM. (Conservation International, “Innovando la gestión del Bosque de Protección Alto Mayo.”)

BPAM carbon credits have been purchased by companies like Walt Disney, which seek to "offset" their polluting activities (such as cruise ships and resorts) and promote a "green" corporate image (Escobar, “Disney Helps Dreams Come True In Peru’s Alto Mayo Forest.”). This is a false solution because it doesn't address the root causes of pollution.

This is a REDD+ project that was established without a free, prior, and informed consultation process with the Awajún indigenous community. The project restricts and impedes the work of local farmers, as well as their access to basic services such as health and education, in order to discourage local residents from remaining in the area (Begert, “Cuando los bonos de carbono expulsan a las personas de sus hogares.”).

Since 2008, the NGO Conservation International (CI) began offering conservation agreements to farmers in the BPAM. In 2012, CI signed the BPAM Management Contract with the Peruvian government. To this day, CI manages the BPAM in partnership with SERNANP (National Service of Natural Areas Protected by the State) and local NGOs ECOAN, ProNaturaleza, Proyecto Mono

Tocón, AIDER, and the SPDA. Farmers who sign agreements with CI receive support for the cultivation and sale of coffee and other crops in exchange for not cutting down trees or expanding their crops. The BPAM is staffed by park rangers and armed police, and restrictions on the forest are a source of social unrest (Lang, "Fortress Conservation: Disney's Offsets Are Paying for Heavily Armed Park Rangers in Conservation International's Alto Mayo REDD Project in Peru."). In 2016, ronderos representing 250 families who opposed relocation (with possible connections to illegal logging) kidnapped police officers, prosecutors, and BPAM park rangers (El Comercio, "San Martín."). By that year, more than a third of the farmers who signed the agreement had withdrawn from the program (Chambers, Massarella, and Fletcher, "The Right to Fail?"). In 2019, ronderos blocked the road for four days protesting eviction plans. In 2022, it was reported that approximately half of the farmers in the BPAM were opposed to signing an agreement, as the agreements limit their self-determination and compensation was insufficient. There was also reported distrust toward the BPAM administration and the Peruvian state, which intentionally restrict access to healthcare and education for those living in the park (Begert, "Cuando los bonos de carbono expulsan a las personas de sus hogares."). It is known that the reported achievements (in reducing deforestation) are based on inflated figures (Chambers, Massarella, and Fletcher, "The Right to Fail?"), that farmers are unaware that they are part of REDD+ or the sale of carbon credits, and that the BPAM was established without proper prior consultation with Awajún communities (Begert, "Cuando los bonos de carbono expulsan a las personas de sus hogares.").

Tambopata-Bahuaja Sonene REDD+ Project

- Within the Tambopata National Reserve and the Bahuaja-Sonene National Park in the region of Madre de Dios - Peru.
- Established in 2010 by the Peruvian NGO AIDER, in agreement with the national park service (SERNANP). Set up with a 5.6M Euro loan from Althelia Climate Fund.
- Established without consulting the local Ese Eja indigenous community.
- Involves the population signing an agreement to not cut down trees or expand their crop areas, in exchange for support for agriculture. However, only those with land titles and at least 3 hectares of land qualify.
- The government has granted mining licenses in the Tambopata National Reserve, increasing the population's lack of trust.

The Tambopata Bahuaja-Sonene REDD+ Project operates on 837,153 hectares of the Tambopata National Reserve and Bahuaja-Sonene National Park and their buffer areas in the districts of Tambopata and Inambari in the Madre de Dios region. The project is operated by the NGO AIDER and SERNAP (National Secretariat of Forestry and Forestry).

Carbon credits are marketed by Althelia Climate Fund through Ecosphere+. These credits can be purchased by companies seeking to offset their emissions without reducing their pollution at the root. This is a REDD+ project. The Ese Eja people were not consulted prior to its implementation, and they claim that the project fails to recognize their collective property rights and impairs their self-determination over their ancestral territory (Forest Peoples Programme, "The Reality of REDD+ in Peru.").

The Tambopata Bahuaja-Sonene REDD+ Project was established in 2010 by the Peruvian NGO Association for Integral Research and Development (AIDER) in partnership with SERNANP (National Service of Natural Protected Areas by the State) (AIDER, “REDD+ Tambopata - Bahuaja Sonene.”). Both entities partially manage the Tambopata National Reserve and the Bahuaja-Sonene National Park . The project has been financed by the Althelia Climate Fund (through a €5.6 million loan (2014-2020)). The REDD+ project includes conservation agreements with farmers, the promotion of productive activities such as cocoa, and monitoring and control posts. To access the program, farmers must have a title or certificate of possession for their land, as well as a minimum of 3 hectares of land, which excludes low-income farmers. The economic benefits have been inequitable and insufficient. By 2019, a carbon credit from the project was only worth between \$2 and \$3, 75% of which remained with the investor, Althelia. Local communities have criticized the entry of NGOs into the area for a loss of local culture, including a decreased use of native languages (Sanchez, “Analysis of the effectiveness, efficiency and co-benefits of REDD projects in the Peruvian Amazon in the period 2017-2022.”). The Ese Eja people claim that the project affects their self-determination over their ancestral territory. The Ese Eja were not consulted prior to the implementation of the REDD+ project, and their right to free and informed consent (beyond consultation) was not respected, nor was their collective right to property recognized. The parks are claimed to be the property of the Peruvian state, which has granted mining licenses and approved an oil block in the Tambopata National Reserve (Forest Peoples Programme, “The Reality of REDD+ in Peru.”).

Cordillera Azul National Park REDD+ Project

- Located across the regions of San Martín, Ucayali, Huánuco and Loreto in Peru.
- Established in 2008 by the Peruvian NGO CIMA, in agreement with the national park service. Althelia Climate Fund provided a 8.8M Euro loan in 2014.
- Research has found that the project underestimates its deforestation rates to sell more credits.
- Established without consulting the local Kichwa indigenous community. In 2021, indigenous organizations raised a grievance to the IUCN , yet Cordillera Azul remains on the IUCN’s Green List (gold conservation standard).
- In 2020, the Kichwa sued the state. In December 2024, the San Martin High Court granted the Kichwa a historic win. The state must now give land title to the Puerto Franco community, grant the Kichwa access to the protected area, implement prior consultation, and allow the Kichwa to benefit from carbon credit sales.
- Among others, TotalEnergies, Shell, BHP, Repsol, CEPSA, British Airways, Etihad, Delta, Ben & Jerry’s, Procter & Gamble, Bank of America have purchased Cordillera Azul carbon credits.

The REDD+ project in the Cordillera Azul National Park operates on 1,351,964 hectares spanning the regions of San Martín, Ucayali, Huánuco, and Loreto. The project is operated by the NGO CIMA (Treecreds, “Cordillera Azul National Park REDD+ Project (Peru).”). Carbon credits have been acquired mainly by oil companies TotalEnergies and Shell (Lang, “Weaving the Defence of

the Kichwa Territory in the Face of the Conservation of the Cordillera Azul National Park.”). TotalEnergies and Shell are among the most polluting companies on the planet. Bond purchases are greenwashing, as they fail to address pollution at its root and allow these companies to claim to be "sustainable" and "carbon neutral."

This is a REDD+ project that was created without the free, prior, and informed consent of the Kichwa people. In January 2024, Indigenous organizations issued the Shilcayo Declaration, in which they denounce the unjust system of protected natural areas and reaffirm their fight for territorial self-demarcation. They denounce that the government has not respected the agreements reached, that CIMA and SERNANP are trying to divide Indigenous communities, and that Kichwa leaders are being criminalized (IDL, “Declaración de Shilcayo.”).

The Cordillera Azul National Park was created in 2001, and in 2002, CIMA (Center for Conservation, Research, and Management of Natural Areas) signed an agreement to manage the park. The REDD+ project began in 2008. In 2014, CIMA obtained an €8.55 million loan from the Althelia Climate Fund in exchange for the right to sell 8 million carbon credits. A 2023 study found that the project uses inflated deforestation reduction figures, allowing CIMA to generate greater revenue while deforestation in the National Park continues (Davey, “‘Gone Wrong’: Doubts on Carbon-Credit Program in Peru Forest | AP News.”). The Ethnic Council of the Kichwa Peoples of the Amazon (CEPKA) has denounced that the National Park was established without obtaining the free, prior, and informed consent of the Indigenous peoples living in the area. In 2020, the Kichwa people (through CEPKA and the Puerto Franco Community) filed a lawsuit against the Peruvian State demanding respect for their right to occupy and use the territory for traditional subsistence activities, as well as their right to participate in the management of the area as part of their right to self-determination (Forest Peoples Programme, “Press Release.” and Ruiz Molleda, Gavancho Leon, and Sangama Cachay, “Comunidad Puerto Franco.”). They also demand the equitable distribution of benefits obtained from conservation activities, such as the sale of carbon offsets. In 2021, Indigenous organizations also filed a complaint with the IUCN for having added the Cordillera Azul National Park to its Green List (IUCN, “Apertura de Consulta Pública para el Parque Nacional Cordillera Azul en Perú - Noticias | IUCN.”), so far without change (IUCN, “Cordillera Azul National Park.”). In December 2024, a historic decision ruled in favor of the Kichwa people on appeal. The Superior Court of Justice of San Martín has ordered the titling of the Kichwa community of Puerto Franco, that park rangers not impede the Kichwa people's access to natural resources, that the Kichwa people benefit from the sale of carbon credits, and that prior consultation be implemented (Forest Peoples Programme, “Comunidad kichwa Puerto Franco logra una victoria histórica en su lucha contra la conservación excluyente del Parque Nacional Cordillera Azul y su proyecto de créditos de carbono (REDD+).”).

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Las Bambas mining project

- A copper exploitation site in Apurimac, Peru that is estimated to supply 2% of global copper.
- Currently financed by Chinese capital -- also the main buyer of copper.
- Since its implementation in 2015, Las Bambas has led to a prolonged social conflict marked by the criminalization and deaths of peasant leaders and protestors.
- Amidst environmental and social harms, Las Bambas seeks to become a "zero emissions" project and states that its extractive activities are vital for global decarbonization.

The Las Bambas mine, owned by the Chinese company MMG, is estimated to produce 2% of the world's copper (Sax, "Proposed Copper Mine Modifications Spark Community Outcry in Peru."). In the current context of energy transition, demand for minerals like copper is on the rise (Mills, "Five Reasons Why We Are Entering the next Copper Super Cycle."). Furthermore, as part of its corporate policy, it seeks to become a "zero-emissions" project (MMG Las Bambas, "Sustainability Report 2024.") and cut its emissions by 40% by 2030 (Desde Adentro, "Las Bambas reducirá en 40% sus emisiones al año 2030."). It is one of the largest copper mines in the world (MMG, "Las Bambas.").

It is located in Apurímac, in the province of Cotabambas, and from there begins the southern mining corridor, which includes a series of mining projects, including the Canadian company Hudbay, in the province of Chumbivilcas, and Antapaccay, owned by the Swiss company Glencore, both copper mines.

It assumes that copper mining is fundamental to the energy transition and gives Peru "the opportunity" to be part of the "mitigation" against climate change. However, to achieve this, territories are destroyed and ultimately sacrificed, local sustainable dynamics are shifted to predatory and dependent ones, and mega technologies are promoted for extraction rather than for distributing wealth and well-being among the population. It is based on changing the energy matrix without questioning the extraction, transformation, exchange, consumption, and accumulation activities generated by mining.

The mining company's main shareholder is currently the Chinese state. MMG's major shareholder is China Minmetals Corporation (CMC), one of China's major multinational state-owned enterprises (MMG, "Company Overview."). Furthermore, China is currently the largest buyer of copper and the main destination for copper exports (Shanghai Metal Market, "China Remains Peru's Largest Copper Exporter - Shanghai Metal Market.").

The mine's scale encompasses the territories of several rural communities. Its entry into operation has impacted communities' rights and generated conflicts, disruptions to livelihoods, violence, repression, and state criminalization, and has currently triggered informal mining activities.

The territorial impact of this mining project coincides with the number of studies conducted by public and independent institutions on pollution. In addition, Las Bambas has accumulated 26

violations by the environmental monitoring agency (Maquet, Niederberger, and Yauri, "Documento de Trabajo Transición Justa: El Cobre Para La Transición Energética y El Corredor Del Sur Andino.").

The Las Bambas mining project began in 2004 with a concession granted to the Anglo-Swiss multinational company Xstrata Copper. Initially, the project involved the construction of a mineral pipeline to transport production to the city of Espinar, where the former Tintaya mine, also owned by Xstrata, was located. In 2013, the company was acquired by the Swiss company Glencore; and in 2014, the majority of the shares were sold to the Chinese consortium MMG Limited. During these years, the project abandoned the mineral pipeline and, through a lower-level environmental authorization, managed to transport the mineral by road. In 2018, the Peruvian government classified this highway as a "national highway," generating a conflict between rural communities over the affected properties. Furthermore, the heavy traffic on this highway has caused various impacts on community members. As a result, community protests have occurred repeatedly, with road blockades being the most frequently used method. In response, protesters have been repressed, criminalized, and lethal force has been used, resulting in the deaths of community members (Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina, "Las Bambas."). Furthermore, mining revenue has led to various power groups vying for public institutions, generating corruption and violence.

In 2015, various urban social organizations and peasant communities protested, demanding participation and transparency in the decisions affecting their territory due to the Las Bambas mining activities. State repression resulted in the deaths of three community members, and a state of emergency was immediately declared in the mining corridor to control the population. The mining company prosecuted the resistance activists, peasant community members without access to basic sanitation services, demanding civil reparations of up to \$80,000. Ten years later, in April 2025, the Superior Court of Justice of Apurímac acquitted the criminalized human rights and nature defenders, while the communities continue to await justice for the three deaths that occurred during the protests and for the environmental impacts in the region, including river pollution and the presence of lead in the blood of children (Herrada, "Las Bambas y una década de resistencia.").

Additional cases:

Ocho Sur in Ucayali: oil palm products and by-products

Cacao del Norte in Loreto: palm oil for biofuels

Next steps

To finalize pending cases and submit them

Comms campaign with MOCICC to encourage additional submissions

Possible in-person or hybrid event to disseminate the map and the cases in Peru

Reactivate Mapeo Amaru? (map of alternatives)

In early 2025, one of our working group members attended an in-person convening of PLACJC in Bolivia, where our mapping work was well received. As of June 2025, we are the only group to have submitted additional cases to the map in Peru.

In reference to the climate crisis, I prefer to think of meaningful alternatives rather than “solutions.” Solutions seem technocratic: concrete, well-defined, and posited as a “fix” to a problem that is also concrete and well-defined. When referring to the climate crisis, I think that the term “solutions” carries the risk of allowing us to believe that there can be a (quick) fix; a specific, measurable action or set of actions that will “resolve” the “problem.” There is an arrogance to that as well, not dissimilar to the arrogance that got us into this crisis in the first place. In this context, I am interested in both unmasking false “solutions” to the climate crisis, as a tool for collective resistance to the same, and in exploring meaningful alternatives to the climate crisis – that is, alternatives that defy the hegemonic paradigms that are at the root of the current polycrisis, and are rooted in community.

Final Reflections on Collaboration

Through this work, I have learned that nurturing community is the number one need/precondition, and a vital source of joy, hope and grounding. Amidst climate angst, corrupt and seemingly all-powerful governments and private actors, paralyzing pessimism and apathy, repression and more; community holds us together, supports us, and allows the work to be possible. I am grateful to continue to be in community, and actually in chosen family, with the core TierrActiva Peru group, a decade after we first started working together. We continue to be there for each other - especially in a time of political crisis and major steps away from justice in Peru, affecting all of us in multiple ways-, as well as sharing information and resources, and collaborating in various ways.

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